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1. Introduction 
What I intend to do is offer some comments, criticisms and suggestions 
on a variety of topics. Several are in the area of forensics and litigation and 
several have to do with Biomedical issues. The particular topics tend to be 
somewhat disparate so I hope you will bear with me as I make a somewhat 
disjointed transition from one topic to another. Before I start I will briefly 
report on an apparently new historical terminology which both peeved and 
amused me. 
A book called "Other Losses" was published in Canada by James Bacque 
(1989). It received considerable media attention mainly in Canada and 
Germany since it asserted that close to one million German prisoners of war 
held by the Americans and French during the World War Il period, perished 
through the deliberate efforts of General Eisenhower to satisfy a personal 
hatred of Germans (a priori difficult to believe given that Eisenhower's 
ancestors were German). What piqued my interest was a comment by the 
N.Y. Times Book reviewer, S.E. Ambrose (1991) who stated that the author's 
statistical methodology was hopelessly compromised. It appeared that most 
of the purported "statistical" evidence used to buttress the author's argument 
that Eisenhower starved the German P.O.W.'s to death depended on missing 
records, missing bodies, missing numbers, and lastly, missing orders on 
Eisenhower's part to reduce prisoner rations. The author, James Bacque, 
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neither historian nor statistician but previously a writer of fiction, documents 
his case by imputing, adjusting and devising incriminating numbers, 
especially where data are missing to support this extremely unlikely 
hypothesis. Was this compromised statistical methodology? Another 
reviewer, A.E. Cowdry (1990), who reviewed the book in a journal of medical 
history and whose statistical competence exceeded that of the Times 
reviewer, correctly labeled it as just bad arithmetic, inability to read a table of 
numbers and a misunderstanding of definitions among other things. 
Apparently compromised statistical methodology is now social science jargon 
for faulty arithmetic. 
2. Forensics and Litigation 
2.1. Scientific Misconduct 
At any rate, the kinds of things that statisticians are called upon for 
advice or consultation are extraordinarily diverse. Not too long ago I 
received a telephone call from an employee of a Federal agency, who after 
introducing himself said "I understand that you are an expert in the falsifying 
of data". What was that, I responded? He thought I misheard so he repeated 
himself. Now as you know, ancient Gaul during the time of Caesar was 
divided into three parts, so too is modern gall the usual bladder and stones, 
and the third that appeared to be reflected here - unmitigated. 
This sort of view of what a statistician does is not restricted to that of 
the average citizen but often extends to the highest reaches of our 
government. Witness the statement made by the Senate Majority leader early 
this year when commenting on some economic data he was shown, whose 
particular selection he did not appreciate. He remarked that it was "an 
obvious statistician's trick". Not an economist's trick nor an 
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econometrician's trick nor heaven forbid a politician's trick but a statistician's 
trick. So knavish does our discipline appear even to educated outsiders. 
Now back to the phone call. When I seemed offended at the remark 
made by the man who called - he said no, you misunderstood, what I meant 
was that as a statistician, you are expert in data falsification. It really didn't 
sound any better this time - but I asked him somewhat warily what it was he 
wanted of me. It turned out what he really wanted was someone to look at a 
Biomedical experimenter's notebooks and published papers and to 
investigate an allegation that this scientific worker submitted falsified data in 
order to obtain federal grants. If the evidence indicated this, there would be 
interest in prosecuting the individual to recover the funds and damages. 
In looking over the material it was clear that this experimenter didn't 
use any esoteric or elegant statisticians' tricks at all. Apparently in reporting 
data if a mean of a set of quadruplicate measurements did not suit his 
purpose, he arbitrarily omitted one value in his publications, either the 
largest or the smallest or sometimes retaining only 2 of them, so that the 
resulting mean better supported his hypotheses - why not, isn't that what 
statistics was for, to verify an experimenter's hypotheses? 
Among other things, his graphs reflected not his collected data but 
apparently created data that again demonstrated support for his hypotheses. 
When deleting an observation he sometimes retained the original sample 
variance. Either this was out of sheer laziness or his statistics course was so 
unsophisticated as not to realize that for the value of a sample variance, that 
deletes the largest or smallest of 4 observations, to remain unchanged 
requires the omitted value to be a unique function of the other 3 
observations. Perhaps he may have had a more sophisticated course that 
included the fact that the sample mean and sample variance from a normal 
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population were independent - from which he may have inferred that there 
was no need to recompute the sample variance. Who knows? What else 
might one conclude from all of this other than gross incompetence or the 
more obvious scientific misconduct? At any rate, alleged scientific fraud 
involving statistical manipulations may not always be as easy to demonstrate, 
unless the original experimental data sheets have been sequestered, as it was 
here, by a distrustful laboratory assistant. 
Although detecting scientific misconduct or data falsification appears to 
be a new venue for the statistical enterprise, I need only remind you of 
Fisher's view of some of Mendel's genetic data, wherein he attributed the 
extraordinary fit to an overzealous assistant who in Fisher's words "cooked 
the data" because he knew what was required. 
2.2. DNA Fingerprinting 
Testimony in court based on the use or abuse of a relatively new 
forensic tool, under the rubric of "DNA fingerprinting", is being heard with 
increasing frequency in criminal and p·aternity trials throughout this country. 
"DNA fingerprinting" or pattern matching is of potentially enormous 
value in problems of individual identification. Its power derives from the 
fact that the locus on a chromosome that is probed has a multitude of 
presumably discrete expressions or alleles (estimated at anywhere from 30 to 
2000 or more), which after much technical manipulation, namely agarose 
submarine gel electrophoresis and Southern blotting, are transformed into 
two band weights measured in DNA base pairs. The bands arise one from 
each parent but one cannot generally ascertain which band is from which 
parent. 
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Several probes often on different chromosomes yield a profile of band 
values that constitutes the so-called DNA fingerprint. These profiles can be 
obtained from a variety of human tissue. It is also claimed that for every 
individual, variation of the same probe between tissues, be it blood, semen, 
hair, etc., is virtually the same as the variation of repetitions of the probe 
within any tissue. This increases its potential use by orders of "forensic 
magnitude" over the usual fingerprint data. Its value rests in its capacity in 
the preponderance of cases to demonstrate the incompatibility of a forensic 
sample with that of a victim or suspect depending on circumstances. These 
are the ones that don't come to court. The ones that do are those claimed to 
be putative matches. 
What is the problem then? First is the fact that the technical procedure 
is unable to resolve the band values of proximal alleles, thus requiring 
inferential statistical methods. This in itself need not be a problem, but the 
use of statistical methods by geneticists, molecular biologists, and biochemists 
in defining a match between two samples may be. The second major problem 
involves determining the relative frequency of an individual's pattern on a 
few probes in an appropriate population, since populations appear to differ in 
the distribution of band weights. The latter became an issue when 
infinitesimally small values - as low as one in many trillions - were assigned 
to this probability or relative frequency in specific instances. This was 
particularly disconcerting as the size of populations that were used was 
generally between 100 and 400 for any probe. The ability to achieve such 
small estimates rested mainly on the assumptions that not only were the 
probes statistically independent but so were the bands within each probe. 
These assumptions enabled the use of what geneticists term the product rule 
(i.e., multiplication of relative frequencies) for the 2 bands within the 4 probes 
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generally used. Within a probe the "Hardy-Weinberg Law" was invoked and 
between probes, linkage equilibrium. These genetical concepts are 
synonymous with statistical independence. Geneticists affirm that the Hardy-
Weinberg law is the culmination of a sufficient number of generations in a 
population in which a large enough proportion in each generation are 
randomly mating. 
The first problem is to decide whether a forensic sample generally 
obtained at the scene of the crime (which may be somewhat degraded) is a 
match for a freshly collected sample from a suspect. Various labs use various 
criteria - after visually checking to see if the two samples are similar or not. If 
presumed similar it is numerically checked by determining whether at each 
probe the two sample values are within a given percent of one another; the 
percent will vary with the laboratory. The distribution of the band weights in 
a probe reflecting the discrete alleles are considered to be quasi continuous 
because of their large number and the fact that it is not possible to resolve 
alleles that are not far apart. 
S~dies on replicates on the same individual indicate the adequacy of 
the normal distribution, but with a measurement error that depends on the 
bandweight of the allele so that the estimated standard deviation is 
somewhere between .06% and .09% of the bandweight. They also indicate 
that the larger the bandweight, the larger the percent error in the range 
studied. To further complicate matters, there is no known distributional 
pattern of how the alleles vary on a given probe. And there are obvious 
distributional differences from probe to probe. Coupled with this is the 
inability to differentiate the bandweights as to maternal and paternal which 
would not be a problem under approximate bivariate normal theory for the 
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distribution of the bands in a population. However, this is clearly an 
inappropriate assumption except if an adequate transformation can be found. 
If a match is declared then the sample is compared with a data base that 
purports to be a sample from the same population as the suspect as an 
estimate of a random match. The data base generally consists of a size of 100-
400 individuals who have been measured on these probes to determine the 
relative frequency of individuals in that population considered to have the 
same profile as the suspect. These data bases are often incomplete i.e. some 
individuals on some probes but not on others and only a fraction of the total 
on all of them. 
Further, the sampling of populations is not only not random but not 
even haphazard - rather it is catch as catch can, with the necessity that 
sometimes the catch should be canned as quite often the same individual 
may appear more than once in a sample. In a recent FBI sample of about 200 
men submitted in a Minneapolis court case, it was found by the defense that 8 
individuals had been duplicated and 1 triplicated. Further a data base was 
obtained where an appreciable percentage of individuals had 3 and 
sometimes 4 bands. No apparent error in the technique could be found to 
account for this. Some wag suggested the possibility of multiple fathers. 
It is of some interest to note that while the standard deviation has been 
variously estimated as being between .6 - .9% of the band weight, the FBI 
(Budowle et al. 1991) with some exceptions, will declare a match between two 
samples if the bands are within 2.5% of the average of the 2, or they can differ 
by as much as 5%. Note that this is a tolerance of about 4 standard deviations 
of the difference i.e. things that are as far apart as 4 s.d. will be considered a 
match. A match then is yes or no without indicating its probability or 
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likelihood i.e., just within 4 s.d. is considered a match and just beyond is not 
considered a match. 
What is used then is an extraordinarily wide net to declare a match and 
then a potentially biased data base, usually collected for entirely different 
reasons and often from geographically distant populations to estimate the 
profile characteristics of a local population. Different laboratories use 
different methods to estimate the relative frequency of individuals that have 
the same profile as the one in question. They tend to neglect sampling error 
and more importantly assume statistical independence without proper 
validation. In fact it has been shown that on several probes this is an 
inappropriate assumption. This has been pointed out by the use of a chi-
squared test created from the joint quantiles into an upper triangular 
contingency table with cells consisting of the number of pairs of observations, 
both of whose members are in the appropriate bivariate quantiles. 
The meager proficiency testing done is on fresh samples rather than on 
somewhat degraded forensic samples. These tests, scant though they are, 
indicate that there are about 2% false positive and 2% false negative rates in 
the matching procedure. These values are incompatible with the 
infinitesimally small probability estimates of a random match in a data base 
that are presented in court. Recently this was pointed out in a trial by a 
defense witness. In order to attempt to nullify the evidence inherent in 
proficiency testing the prosecutor deliberately mispronounced the name of 
the witness, after correctly pronouncing it many times. When the witness 
corrected him as the prosecutor expected he would, the prosecutor retorted 
that because he had mispronounced the name once in 20 times could anyone 
believe he would ever do it again! So much for analogy and error rates. 
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At any rate, with all these problems it is unconscionable that the three 
laboratories which provide almost all of these analyses have not yet seen fit to 
employ statistical help in improving their procedures. Some work in the 
statistical direction using likelihood ratios is discussed in Berry (1991), but the 
major improvements should come from a potential elimination of the error 
in identifying an allele by the introduction of the new polymerase chain 
reaction (PCR) technology and obtaining larger and better samples from 
appropriate populations. 
2.3. Increased Risk and Causal Analysis 
In Israel about 300,000 children per year are subjected to DPI' 
(Diphtheria, Pertussis, Typhoid) immunization. There is an accepted risk of 
encephalopathy leading to irreversible brain damage (IBO) of about 1 case in 
310,000 for those given the DPT vaccine, which is slightly higher than among 
non-vaccinated children. Parents are informed of this risk and accept it in 
terms of the potential benefits of the vaccine. A case that came up there for 
litigation was described by Aitken (1991). In one such year there were 4 cases 
and the parents of one of the victims sued the Ministry of Health, claiming 
that year's vaccine given to their child was defective. Each side engaged a 
statistician only to determine the answer to the question of whether there was 
an increased risk in that year. Note that this bears only on the predictive 
causal proposition could or will the administration of the new pertussis 
vaccine increase IBO over the older one but not on the retrodictive 
proposition (did it) that the vaccine caused IBO in this case. Even if it were 
virtually certain that the vaccine could cause an increase of IBO, it might be 
virtually certain retrodictively that it did not do so in this case. 
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In considering the difference between prediction and retrodiction there 
is the story of the man who visits a fortune teller. She looks into her crystal 
ball and tells him that he will lose his job, his wife will leave him and he will 
have a terrible auto accident. But he tells her, all of that happened to me last 
week. She looks again into her crystal ball, picks it up, shakes it vigorously 
and holds it up to her ear and says, the damned thing stopped. 
In order to answer the indicated question, both statisticians agreed on 
the use of a Poisson approximation to the binomial data and the calculations 
made were based on the assumptions they were given. Hence they agreed to 
the following calculations. If X =#of cases out of 300,293 vaccinations, then 
Pr(X=x I He,) = e-.97 / x! 
X Pr(X=xlHo) Pr[~IHc,] 
0 .368 1.000 
1 .368 .632 
2 .178 .253 
3 .058 .075 
4 .014 .017 
5 or more .003 .003 
Both statisticians calculated as a test of the null hypothesis that the risk was 
1/310,000, 
Pr[~4 I Ho1 = .02. 
The question in dispute was whether this was strong evidence of an increased 
risk or not. One statistician said that since it did not reach the .01 level 
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though it exceeded the .05 level the evidence was minimal but not strong 
evidence of an increased risk. The other argued that it was sufficient. The 
judge admonished them that he was the one to decide on minimal or 
sufficient. 
It appears that the statisticians were not asked the critical question. 
That question should have been concerned with the chance that this child's 
encephalopathy was caused by that year's vaccine. This is a much more 
difficult question than to assess whether there was an increase in the damage 
rate. Naively one might go about it as follows: H the datum were 2 cases that 
year, then the P-value would be .253 and both statisticians would have 
concurred that there was insufficient evidence to deny the damage rate of 1 in 
310,000. One then might argue that if this were the case that one would allow 
only 2 of the 4 to be attributable to the vaccine. Given the absence of other 
information one could regard the cases as exchangeable so the chance that this 
child's condition was caused by the increased damage rate was 1/2. Ha P-
value of .075 were allowed by both statisticians to be insufficient to reject the 
H0 so that 3 cases would still be admissible in denying an increase in the 
damage rate then the chance would be reduced to 1/4. On the other hand if 
only 1 was attributable to the usual risk, then probability would be 3 / 4. 
However such reasoning might appeal to a judge, what one really needs is to 
calculate the probability that the vaccine caused IBO in this particular child 
after marshalling all the relevant evidence. 
How was the case resolved? It was settled out of court, as most such 
cases are, not necessarily in the interest of "scientific truth", whatever that 
might be in this instance, but for the sake of perhaps higher truths, prudence 
and economics. But better still, it resulted in a sensible decision by the 
Ministry to pay compensation for all cases of IBO where a vaccine was 
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administered since the benefits to the nation as a whole far outweighed the 
risks. Potential payment could also spur investment in research for safer 
vaccines. 
Among the circumstances of this particular case is the fact that since it 
is known that the DPT vaccine can cause encephalopathy, it was assumed that 
it did here and the only question apparently at issue was whether there was a 
higher risk with the vaccine used during the particular year of this child's 
vaccination. The arguments in court were restricted mainly to whether a .02 
P-value was sufficiently small to establish the claim. Discussions out of court 
turned on whether a Bayesian analysis involving computation of the 
posterior odds of increased risk might be more informative than a P-value 
and the reluctance of both statisticians, well conversant with and often users 
of the Bayesian approach, to implement it here because they believed 
standard methods were more widely understood and acceptable. 
However, the basic and important question was left unresolved both in 
a legal or a scientific sense. That is, given an adverse reaction in an 
individual what is the chance that it was caused by a particular drug, vaccine, 
therapy or whatever? 
Now one promising development of the use of probabilistic methods 
in causality assessment has been underway for the last few years with special 
reference to adverse reactions to drugs in clinical practice, Lane (1989). 
However the methodology is general enough so that it can be applied to 
many other areas. The method involves a panel of subject experts and a 
statistician to guide the proceedings which results in recommending a 
decision based on the expert's retrodiction about the probability of what 
occurred. These procedures can be guided by one or more or even all of the 
following principles of the 3 reigning schools of Statistics: 
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Fisher-Barnard: Separate the relevant information from the irrelevant 
information. 
De Finetti-Savage: Analysis should be logically consistent. 
Neyman-Pearson: Minimize the proportion of incorrect decisions. 
Here is a rather simple but instructive instance of an analysis of a case 
of encephalopathy in Canada, Lane (1991). An 8-week male infant who at the 
time he received his DPT vaccine had mild coryza (inflammation of the 
mucous membranes of the nose giving rise to sneezing and discharge of 
mucous). At 12 hours post immunization the child was fevered and 100 
hours later developed encephalopathy with decreased state of consciousness 
and a fever of about 103°F. A radiograph of the chest suggested the possibility 
of viral pneumonia. The two possibilities that were not ruled out for the 
encephalopathy were the vaccine and the virus and an attempt was made to 
calculate the relative odds. Hence using Bayes' theorem, 
Pr(V ~E I B,C) 
Pr(v~E I B,C) = 
Pr(V ~E I B) Pr(C IV ~E,B) 
Pr(v~E I B) Pr(C I v~E,B) 
where B = Background, V = vaccine, v = virus, E = Encephalopathy, C = case 
information and the arrow implies causation. Data were obtained on the 
incidence of viral encephalopathy not preceded by vaccination in children< 1 
year old to be 3.2 per million. 
From another study, they estimated an incidence of vaccine induced 
encephalopathy to be 8.9 per million in the first week following 
immunization, hence 
13 
Pr(V ~E I B) 8.9 
Pr(v~E I B) - 3.2 = 2·8· 
However, viral encephalopathy is twice as likely to occur in summer 
than other times i.e. summer incidence is 6.4 per million which is 
differentially diagnostic, there being no plausible mechanism for causation by 
the vaccine to exhibit seasonal variation. Now this case occurred during the 
summer and since viral encephalopathy is twice as likely to occur in summer, 
Pr(C5 IV ~E,B) _ 1. 
Pr(C I v~E,B) - 2 . 
s 
Further, on the basis of expert opinion and some mechanistic 
modeling probabilities of .8, .15 and .05 were assigned to the probability of 
vaccine-induced encephalopathy for the days 1, 2, 3 following vaccination. 
For viral encephalopathy each day of a reference week was equally likely, i.e. 
1/7 since the onset was on the third day 
Pr(CT I V~E,B) _05 
Pr(C I v~E,B) = 1/7 = ·35· 
T 
The panel also ascertained that on an average there are 5 viral illnesses 
during a child's first year, each lasting a week. They also estimated that 10% 
of children would have a concurrent viral syndrome. Further, the relevant 
literature indicates that 1 / 4 of children with presumed viral encephalopathy 
have a history of antecedent viral syndrome. Thus, 
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hence 
Pr(CH IV ...+E,B) l/lO 
------=--=.4 Pr(C lv-+E,B) 1/4 
H 
Pr[C I V-+E,B] 
Pr[C I v-+E,B] 
Pr(V-+E I B,C) 
Pr(v-+E I B,C) 
.5 X .35 X .4 
2.8 X .5 X .35 X .4 = .19 
which now favors a virus induced encephalopathy by about 5 to 1. 
A causal analysis of this sort would be more direct and useful than just 
determining an increased damage rate and obviously more informative to a 
court than an expert merely stating his opinion as to whether or not an event 
was caused by a particular agent. 
3. Medicine 
3.1. Mass Screening 
An area involving public policy and health in which statisticians can 
play an important role is in the planning of mass screening tests. Let me say 
that these tests are certainly going to come. ff mass screening of physicians, 
dentists and other health care personnel for lilV (Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus) is a strong possibility, then patients are not far behind if not already 
done surreptitiously. Screening for venereal diseases prior to marriage has a 
long history. In my own state there has been a movement towards mass 
screening for AIDS. Some countries and many states in the U.S. have begun 
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mass screening of pregnant women for HBV (Hepatitis B Virus) carriers. 
Infants with less developed immune systems are much more susceptible than 
adults to the disease which can cause incurable liver cancer later in life. 
Since testing for any characteristic is not an inexpensive commodity 
when conducted on large populations, statisticians should play an important 
role in the planning of mass screening programs so that testing may be 
conducted in an optimal or near optimal manner in terms of costs and 
benefits with appropriate balancing of societal concerns and individual rights. 
This should not be left solely to physicians and ethicists. For example in the 
case of IDV, there are at least two tests available for screening purposes - the 
ELISA and the Western Blot, the first being an order of magnitude less costly 
than the other but yielding higher false positive and false negative rates and 
sometimes yielding indeterminate results. Hence whether one needs to 
choose between the two diagnostic tests, or alternatively start with one and 
conditional on that result use or not use the other or to use them both 
sequentially or simultaneously involves a number of statistical questions for 
efficient implementation. 
An optimal procedure will depend on several factors including the 
prevalence of the condition, the probabilities of false positives and false 
negatives, the loss in making incorrect decisions, the relative costs of the tests 
and the costs of their administration. All of these need to be carefully 
considered and estimated in the context of a given population and 
application. Even if the cost per individual may vary only slightly from one 
rule of test administration to another, it is obvious that when these 
differences are multiplied by hundreds of thousands or even millions, one 
may be speaking in the late Sen. Dirksen's famous phrase, of "real money". 
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Consider a mass screening program that has the possibility of using two 
binary tests say for detecting a condition denoted as C for its presence and C 
for its absence as proposed by Geisser and Johnson (1991). We can denote the 
-
outcome Ti and Ti respectively as positive and negative on test i = 1,2. These 
tests can be used in a variety of ways and we will list 8 decision rules out of a 
larger possible number. Rules other than these 8 in Table 1 will be 
inadmissible under sensible ranking assumptions that are made on the 
sensitivities and specificities of the tests and the losses for making incorrect 
decisions. 
Table 1 
Rule Decision Rule T (Assert C ifl Notation 
R1 Test 1 is positive T1 
R2 Test 2 is positive T2 
R3 Both tests positive (simultaneous tests) (T1T2) 
R4 Either test positive (simultaneous tests) (T1uT2) 
Rs Both tests positive (sequential tests) T1T2 
R6 Both tests positive (sequential tests) T2T1 
-R7 Either test positive (sequential tests) T1uT1T2 
-Rs Either test positive (sequential tests) T2uT2T1 
For decision rule Rs, say, we assert the presence of C if test two was 
administered first and was positive or if test two was negative and test one 
was subsequently positive. 
We define our loss function in Table 2. 
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Decision rule T 
-Outcome T 
Table 2 
True State 
C 
Lrc 
i.j,c 
-C 
For example, the cost of a positive decision when C is present is lTC· 
When C denotes, say, the virus for AIDS, there are two points of view 
that one can take regarding this cost function; one from the perspective of 
society and the other from that of the individual. From a societal standpoint, 
it could be argued that 
for example, if one were accepting blood from screened donors. From an 
individual's point of view a public expression of being positive for 1-IlV when 
in fact he is not might be considered worse than saying he is negative when 
in fact he is positive given the stigma that certain people attach to the disease. 
On the other hand, even from an individual prospective given treatment for 
a condition that does not exist certainly may not seem worse than not being 
given treatment for a condition that does exist. In general, it may only be 
reasonable to assume that the costs of making a correct decision are less than 
the costs of making an incorrect decision. 
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Conditional probabilities for the various outcomes of the two tests are 
introduced in Table 3: 
Table 3 
-C C 
- -
T2 T2 T2 T2 
T1 1111 1110 T1 811 810 
- -
T1 1101 1100 T1 801 800 
- -Thus Pr(T1,T2 IC)= 1111, PrCT1,T2 IC)= 801 etc. We define Pr(C) = 1t as the 
prevalence of C. For each of the eight joint tests in Table 1, define the 
sensitivity and specificity as 
11i = Pr(T I C), 0i = Pr(T IC) i= 1, ... ,8. 
For decision rule Ri, the expected loss is 
The values of Pr(T I C) and Pr(T IC) for each of the first 4 decision rules are 
presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4 
Rule# Pr(T IC} (sensitivitt} Pr(T IO (s~ecificitt} 
R1 Th = 1'111 + 1'110 81 = 800 + 801 
R2 112 = 1111 + 1101 82 = 800 + 810 
R3,R5,~ Tl3 = 1111 83 = 800 + 801 + 810 
R4,R7,Rg 1'14 = 1111 + 1'110 + 1'101 84 = 800 
The assumptions that lead to consideration of only these 8 rules are 
max{Lcc, l.i-cl < min{l.rc, G-cl, 
Tl 11 > 'Tlij > Tloo and 800 > 8ij > 811 for i:#:j = 0,1. 
For a mass screening program, such as contemplated for certain 
diseases, it would be desirable to use an optimal rule. Defining 
(3.2) 
k = <l.i-c-Lrc> / <G,c-Lrc + Lrc-.tj,c), it can be shown that the following 
necessary and sufficient conditions hold: 
- -R1 is optimal¢:> Pr(C I T1T2) < k < Pr(C I T1T2). 
- -
R2 is optimal¢:> Pr(C I T1T2) < k < Pr(C I T1T2). (3.3) 
- -
R3 is optimal¢:> Pr(C I T1T2) < k and Pr(C IT1T2) < k. 
- -Rt is optimal¢:> Pr(C I T1T2) > k and Pr(C I T1T2) > k. 
where 
(3.4a) 
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(3.4b) 
In any large scale screening program costs of administering the tests 
will be of considerable concern. For example, with regard to AIDS, the ELISA 
test is an order of magnitude less expensive than the Western Blot. Also, 
there may be a differential in the costs of a simultaneous administration of 
both tests in contrast to their sequential administration. Among other things, 
this may result from having to store the sample until the result from the first 
test is obtained, or asking a testee to return for testing. Once all of the actual 
testing costs are carefully ascertained, their incorporation into a complete 
decision analysis can be made without much difficulty. The major problems 
are in assessing, in some reasonable way, the original losses on .a comparable 
monetary scale with the actual expense of testing. 
Let JG be the cost of administering test i alone, and let Kij be the cost of 
administering test i followed by administering test j. Let Ko2> be the cost of 
administering both tests simultaneously. Clearly, it is reasonable to assume 
that Kij ~ ~12) ~ max(K1,K2). The expected cost under decision rule i is easily 
calculated and values are given in Table 5. 
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Table 5 
Decision Rule E(Cost) 
Rt K1 
R2 K2 
R3 Kc12) 
R4 Ko2> 
Rs Kt +(K12-K1)Pr(T 1) 
R6 K2+(K21-K2)Pr(T 2) 
R7 K1 +(K1rK1)Pr(T 1) 
-
Rs K2+(K21-K2)Pr(T 2) 
The above probabilities in (3.4) are conditional on the parameters, 1t, 8i 
and Th, i=l, ... ,8. The costs in Table 5 must be added to previous losses that 
accrue to each rule. The total expected loss for Rs is greater than that for R3 if 
and only if E(Cost) for Rs is greater than that for R3. The same holds true for 
~ compared with R3• R7 is preferable to R4 if E(Cost) for R7 is less than 
E(Cost) for R4, and the same holds true for Rs compared with R.i- The 
decision as to whether to consider sequential tests versus simultaneous tests 
is based purely on costs. Thus if K12 = K21 = ~12) or more particularly if Kij = 
Kn2> = K1 + K2, then Rs and }¼ will be preferable to R3, and R7 and Rs will be 
preferable to R4. 
This whole discussion has assumed all of the parameters' values were 
known. Inevitably they are not and of course appropriate samples are 
required for their proper estimation whether frequentist or Bayesian. For 
some discussion of the latter issue, see Gastwirth et al. (1991) and Johnson and 
Gastwirth (1991). One also can foresee a situation of more than two binary 
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tests for a condition as is already true for AIDS. There is a more exacting test 
which is now an order of magnitude more expensive than the Western Blot, 
i.e. polymerase chain reaction test. Although in principle it can be handled in 
this manner, the number of potential rules increases exponentially so that 
methods for shortening the search for an optimal rule are also needed. In 
summary, there are many important and interesting problems here where 
biostatisticians can make enormous contributions to the optimal 
implementation of public policy in the health area. 
Biostatisticians should not let other professionals - economists, risk 
analysts, etc. run away with this one because if they don't do it right it will be 
called a statistician's trick anyway. 
3.2. The Issue of Interim Analysis in Clinical Trials 
There are several issues that seem to have plagued frequentist 
Biostatisticians in the conduct and analysis of clinical trials. They are the 
sidedness of a test (one or two), multiple comparisons, and interim analyses. 
I will only address the latter and after a brief introduction confine it to a 
specific issue which interested me. For those interested in other aspects of 
interim analysis as well as this one, the recent review by Jennison and 
Turnbull (1990) should serve. 
Briefly, given that a trial is planned to be analysed for a given number 
of subjects, how should making interim analyses during the course of the 
trial affect the final analysis. There are those who feel that inferences drawn 
should depend on the stopping rule, despite the Likelihood Principle. On the 
other hand they would also like to make interim analyses so that an 
unpromising trial could be abandoned early on, or at any rate, to be able to 
decide whether a trial is promising enough to continue. There are methods 
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which would permit control of type I and type II errors if interim analyses are 
made at preplanned particular sample sizes in a sequential trial, but they 
require that differences be appreciably larger to maintain the requisite Type I 
error compared to a trial where no interim analyses were to be made. 
Coupled with this is the fact that it is not always convenient to conduct 
interim analyses at the preordained sample sizes in a trial. Hence other 
methods have been attempted that permit unplanned interim analyses at 
arbitrary times but yield at best a very conservative test which makes the 
detection of significant differences even more difficult to assert. 
Of course, the Bayesian statistician, who does not pay attention to a 
stopping rule that does not affect the likelihood, has no such problems. 
However, an important trial, especially one that is supposed to test the 
effectiveness of a new agent, should generally be carried out for at least some 
predetermined sample size if the scientific public or general public or a 
regulatory agency is to be convinced of the conclusions drawn. This assumes 
that all other things are equal. And even for a Bayesian this can lead to an 
interim analysis as to whether to continue a trial until its specified term. 
Also, it has been recognized even by those who might prefer a frequentist 
analysis that some Bayesian predictive input could be helpful in such a 
situation, Choi and Pepple (1989), Choi et al. (1985), Spiegelhalter et al. (1986). 
We illustrate the idea that has been proposed by these statisticians in a 
very simple case. Let Xt,···,XN+M be i.i.d. N(8,1) and require a test of the 
following hypothesis, 
For test H0 vs. H 1 at level a, reject Ho if 
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(3.5) 
where a= 1- cl>(za), and cl>(•) is the standard normal distribution function. 
Suppose we stopped after N observations and wanted to calculate the 
probability of achieving the above. 
A syncretic approach has been suggested and developed in the 
previously mentioned papers which apply Bayesian predictive ideas towards 
the solution of this problem. It is assumed that the prior for 0 is constant to 
conform as closely as possible to a frequentist analysis. After N observations 
are in hand, this results in a posterior distribution for 8 as N(XN, ~). 
Now we compute the probability of the aforementioned event 
[ 
t/2[Nx +MX ] l Pr (N+M) ~+M M _ 80 >za =Pa (3.6) 
where XN is fixed and the future XM is random so that the predictive 
- ( 1 1) distribution of XM is easily obtained as N xN, N + M . Hence 
(3.7a) 
or 
(3.7b) 
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On regrouping terms in (3.7), 
(3.8a) 
or 
(3.8b) 
where Z is N(0,1). Further 
(3.9a) 
(3.9b) 
This then is the probability that if the trial were continued for an additional 
M observations, H0 would be rejected at level a. Small values of Pa would 
discourage the continuation of the trial while large values would encourage 
it. But now consider the following easily established result, 
lim P = 1- ct,(-../N~ -8 )) 
M~ a No 
(3.10a) 
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P = Pr[Z ~ -{N(xN98o)1, (3.10b) 
which is independent of a. 
This implies that if one continued the trial indefinitely, the predictive 
probability of rejecting H0 approaches 1-P irrespective of a. Note that this is a 
Bayesian interpretation of 1-P that naive students and some investigators 
often make with regard to significance tests; note also that teachers of 
frequentist statistics strive mightily to disabuse students of this flawed 
interpretation. Therefore I believe that upon reflection, neither a strict 
Bayesian nor Frequentist could accept such a result. On the one hand this 
result does not have an acceptable frequentist interpretation and on the other 
hand this is not the kind of test a Bayesian would apply. One perhaps needs 
to be careful of mixing metaphors. 
A Bayesian approach in this situation would reject H0 , say, if the posterior 
probability 
(3.11) 
assuming a prior 1t(8) for 8. Hence, after N observations one would calculate · 
the predictive probability of the above event assuming x1, ... ,xN have been 
observed and future observables XN+t,···,XN+M are random. In this example if 
the previous prior for 8 is used, then a posteriori 
where 
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then Ho is rejected if 
Pr["N+M (8-x) > "N+M (80-x)] ;?!: p (3.12a) 
or 
(3.12b) 
Now stopping at N, we need to find the predictive probability of the above 
event i.e. 
and finally we obtain 
(3.13) 
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Now if the trial were contemplated to be continued indefinitely, 
limP =l-<1>((8 -x >JN)=Pr[8>80 Ix , ... ,x ] M-+x> p o N 1 N (3.14) 
which does not depend on p and is obviously the posterior probability given 
N observations. This is perfectly sensible as the best prediction of what would 
occur if one were to continue sampling indefinitely. It appears that if 
frequentists start down the slippery slope of Bayesianism they might as well 
slide all the way. 
More useful Bayesian applications to interim analysis are given in 
Geisser (1991). 
3.3. Statistical Regulation of Chronic Diseases 
Although the control or regulation of "abnormal" physiological or 
behavioral variables or symptoms associated with a condition or chronic 
ailment does not have quite the same appeal that therapeutic cures or surgical 
intervention possess, it is probably the most pervasive of medical practice and 
deserves greater attention than it has previously been accorded by 
Bios ta tisticians. 
An important goal in a variety of chronic conditions such as diabetes, 
arthritis, high blood pressure and high cholesterol levels is to regulate or 
control a physiological variable by an appropriate administration of a 
therapeutic agent. For example, severe diabetics need to control their glucose 
level by carefully regulated injections of insulin one or more times a day. 
The amount infused which is controllable will depend on the current glucose 
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level and other both controlled or uncontrolled covariates. What is required 
is a modeled functional relationship of the form 
Y t+ 1 = response to be controlled at t+ 1 
Yt = measured response at time t 
v t = amount of drug to be administered at time t 
Xt = value of a set of covariates at time t 
8 = set of unknown parameters in the functional relationship. 
(3.15) 
For the most recent frequentist way of handling autoregressive models using 
squared error for prediction see Lai and Zhu (1991). 
Models of this sort have been used for engineering problems and they 
also appear in the economics literature e.g. Zellner (1971), but infrequently in 
the biostatistical literature, especially in regard to control of chronic 
conditions. And until "cures" for these are found, it is important that the 
course of these chronic conditions be properly regulated. 
Assuming for a diabetic that at time t we can specify the amount of 
insulin infused then we would want to do so to ensure that the response Y t+ 1 
will be as close as possible to some given value say Yo or with maximal 
probability to be in an interval (y0 +a,y0 +b) for a< b. 
We could perhaps consider the overly simplified linear model for the 
amount of glucose in a diabetic 
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where et+l is N(0,a2) and independent for each t, Yt represents the amount of 
glucose, xt the caloric intake and Vt the amount of insulin to be infused to 
regulate the value Yt+l in some interval. I suspect that even this very simple 
model, with possibly some elaboration, could be adequate for regulation 
purposes in many situations. In general this type of problem is best served by 
obtaining a probability distribution of values for Yt+t, using a Bayesian 
approach based on having observed previous values (yj,vj,xj) j=l, ... ,t and some 
prior distribution for the parameters (a,p,y). Hence for a value as close as 
possible to y0 we could use the predictive squared error . 
;t = min E(Yt+i-Y0 ) 2 = min [V(Yt+t> + (E(Yt+1)-y0 ) 2] 
Vt Vt 
or that value of Vt that maximizes the predictive probability function of Yt+l 
evaluated at Yt+l = Yo using notation a<k> = {a1,. .. ,ak), 
max f { I (t) (t) (t-1) ) y YO Y ,x , V 1 Vt . 
Vt t+l 
Sometimes other loss functions that are asymmetric are appropriate e.g. if a 
diabetic may need to be more wary of going into insulin shock {i.e. too little 
glucose {hypoglycemia)) as opposed to acidosis (i.e. too much glucose 
{hyperglycemia)), or vice versa an asymmetric loss function may serve. If an 
interval is required we then search for that Vt which maximizes 
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The values a and b would yield a symmetric interval about y O if a = -b. 
One could also set a and b to values that to some degree stress the importance 
of being above or below Yo or use a linex loss function Zellner (1986). 
The most difficult issue, of course, is the formulation of an appropriate 
model that adequately reflects the process. Once this is done and sufficient 
data has been obtained, the problem of modeling the prior distribution will be 
relatively unimportant and one can develop numerical methods to obtain 
the values for regulating the response. In fact, for any chronic condition, one 
looks forward to the time when a hand-held programmable calculator can be 
used to compute the approximate therapeutic dose given the current and past 
data, or even more elaborately, a computer-controlled infusion device. 
In conclusion, I hope I have pointed out a few of the interesting 
statistical issues and opportunities involved in forensics, medicine and public 
affairs, not to mention a few idiosyncratic peeves. 
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